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Abstract
This paper looks at the reasons for and results of make or buy in local public
services, with specific regards to its possible effects on price and other performance
determinants. It uses a rich city-level dataset of water utilities in France for four
years. We find evidence that private management is associated with higher prices on
average ceteris paribus. This pattern is consistent with the study of units switching
from an organization to another. We find evidence that the price gap is explained
by differences in water quality and in the level of debt of the public service.
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1 Introduction
For the last forty years, the role of the public sector in providing basic services
such as electricity, gas, water or telephone with a natural monopoly component was
hardly questioned. All over the world thousands of regulated monopolies have been
opened to competition for service provision with different options to organize the
supply of goods. A large part of the theoretical literature on the subject, based on
organizational performance, heavily draws on landmark works by Coase [1937] and
Williamson [1975]. For these authors1, the governance structure of a transaction is a
function of the relative costs of transacting in markets and organizing procurement
within the firm. Since then, economic theories of the organization of production
have supported the superiority of the private sector to produce goods and services
for the economy (Alchian and Demsetz [1972]). In public services where transaction
costs are high, such as water (Brown and Potoski [2003]), contracting out is often
the most frequent way to deliver the service.
This paper studies the impact of private management on retail price in residen-
tial water industries in France. As an empirical laboratory, we use a representative
dataset of 2,455 French cities observed four years: 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2008. A
first look at simple patterns in the data is instructive. A first glance at Table (1)
shows how the prices are related to the organizational form. The price premium
is almost 30 euros on average for a standard bill. Other studies on the subject
show that private management is often associated with higher prices, even if the
price premium lowers when one takes into account panel data and sufficient con-
trols for heterogeneity between utilities (see for example Chong et al. [2006] for a
cross-sectional study of 5,000 French water utilities in 2001 and Chong et al. [2012]
for a panel study of 3,700 water utilities between 1998 and 2008).
We first analyze average differences in retail prices between public and private
provision using different regressors controlling for heterogeneity between observa-
1See Williamson [1985] for the theoretical background and Bresnahan and Levin [2012] for a recent
literature review on the state of the art.
tions and organizational outcomes. As the choice of a managerial form is never
randomized, we need to find out an alternative methodology which at best mim-
ics a natural experiment. We adopt a quasi-experimental differences-in-differences
methodology. We then study price evolution for utilities switching from private to
public management and from public to private management. Even if a switch may
not be randomly carried out, municipalities switching from an organizational form
to the other offer a privileged laboratory to assess public versus private performance.
We then discuss potential endogeneity problems by connecting the decision of the
municipality to outsource the public water service with its contractual capabilities.
We find two key results. First, private provision of water is more expensive than
public provision, even controlling for the characteristics of privately provided water.
However, the price premium is lower than simple means comparison would sug-
gest. Second, focusing on switchers reveals expected yet small differences in retail
prices for consumers. Municipalities switching from public to private management
are characterized by increasing prices, while municipalities switching from private
to public management experience price decrease. However, these price changes are
not always significant. This means that public (private) provision is not directly
associated with lower (higher) prices.
Why, then, are prices higher under private management? We argue in section 5
that differences in price between public and private management can be rooted in
several explanations. Difference in accounting rules for example can lead to cross-
subsidies between different municipal budgets under private management. Here, we
particularly document some important questions such as municipal debt and water
quality. We find that private management is associated with lower municipal debt
as compared to public management. This can explain why the gap between public
and private management reduces through the time interval, as debt refund increases
under public management. Water quality is also significantly improved under pri-
vate management but the difference remains low. This is consistent with the fact
that public and private management do not share the same goals.
The present study has several policy and methodological implications. First,
municipalities that face a make-or-buy decisions must be aware that price differ-
ences are largely driven by structural characteristics of the network. In comparable
cities, the price premium from private participation is low. Second, municipalities
must take into account that lower prices under public management can be linked
to higher future debt refunds. Third, our analysis underscores the difficulty of
determining in advance how provision type impacts prices. Fourth, this paper high-
lights differences in results coming from several methodologies. It provides a clear
structure for researchers focusing on the impact of a strategy or a choice in gover-
nance. It is in line with Angrist and Pischke [2010] who suggested that industrial
organization would benefit from a more intense focus on “natural experiments”,
Hamilton and Nickerson [2003] who declared that research in management needed
more robust results to draw conclusions about the veracity of theory and Masten
[2002] who called for more robust results of the performance of organizational forms.
The water public service in France is a good candidate for an empirical study
of the impact of private participation for several reasons. First, water is a quasi-
homogeneous good with very little differences in quality2. Second, the market for
water distribution is large, covering the whole French population. Third, private
sector participation has been growing since the 1980s. As private firms now serve
more than 60% of the French municipalities, the impact of private participation
can thus be large. Fourth, there are no secondary markets that can mitigate the
impact of the private sector participation or transfer it to other markets, as such
was the case in telecommunications or wireless internet access. Fifth, this market
is suitable for an empirical analysis given the availability of a comprehensive and
representative municipal-level dataset built by the French Statistical Office and in-
cluding thousands of municipalities for 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2008. Finally, perhaps
the most salient motivation for investigating this industry is that the make-or-buy
decision has been the focus of substantial policy attention with French administra-
2Water quality in France has long been guaranteed and is drinkable across the whole French territory,
even in overseas territories.
tive court giving several judgements on these matters.
The paper is linked to a long-established research theme in economics, manage-
ment science and organization theory that studies the link between ownership and
performance. Economists have been keen on analyzing the public vs. private own-
ership debate in public utilities (see Villalonga [2000] for a theoretical and empirical
literature review but also in the competitive market (see Davies [1971],Caves and
Christensen [1980] and Vining and Boardman [1992] for early empirical studies on
the subject). Theoretical backgrounds are usually based on fundamental arguments
of welfare economics: a competitive equilibrium is pareto-optimal. In this sense,
government intervention is required in the case of natural monopolies, externali-
ties, public goods and to a certain extent, for distributional concerns. In regulated
industries with natural monopolies, the argument for a competitive equilibrium is
weaker but still holds for several reasons. Government’s goals can be inconsistent
with efficiency (see the public choice literature, e.g. Niskanen [1975]), be malevolent
(see Spiller [2008] on public actors’ opportunism) or fund inefficient firms (the soft
budget constraints as noticed by Kornai [1986]). A major theme in the literature
is that public ownership is inherently less efficient than private ownership (Alchian
and Demsetz [1972]) since ownership is diffused among all members of society, and
no member has the right to sell their share. Given these aspects of public own-
ership, there is little economic incentive for any owner to monitor the behavior of
the firm’s management. Ownership may not be as important as regulation itself.
Agency models suggest deviations from cost-minimization by effort-averse managers,
especially when managers lack high-powered incentives or proper monitoring (see
Laffont and Tirole [1993] for the theoretical analysis of agency-models). Overall, we
would expect markets to better allocate resources and reduce prices. A substantial
body of empirical evidence documents the superior efficiency of private firms rela-
tive to comparable public firms and the improvement of efficiency after privatization
(see La Porta and López-de Silanes [1999] and Chong and López-de Silanes [2004]
for comprehensive studies and Megginson and Netter [2001] for a large literature
review). Empirical comparisons of private and public ownership in developing coun-
tries have been widely studied in the managerial literature (see Ghorpade [1973] for
an early paper on India and Peng et al. [2004] for a comprehensive study of owner-
ship and performance in China) and shed light on public versus private strategies.
Firms’ strategies are also analyzed in Schargrodsky [2003] who compares public and
private firms in the US newspapers industry and finds that private ownership lowers
selling price. This results from different managers’ strategies and tastes, such as the
quality vs. diffusion trade-off, something that is observed in the public management
literature (see Boyne [2002] for a review). Organization theorists such as Perry and
Rainey [1988] and Klein et al. [2010] proposed an agenda on more research on the
effectiveness and efficiency of alternative governance mechanisms than the market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents water provision regulation
and section 3 presents briefly the dataset. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy
and discusses results of the impact of private participation on prices. Section 5
discusses the results regarding their methodological implications. A brief conclusion
follows.
2 Water Market Regulation
2.1 The Provision of Water in France
In France, as in most European countries, municipalities must provide local public
services that have public good characteristics. Municipalities monitor prices, control
entry and exit of firms into the market, organize competition and ensure uninter-
rupted service. Water provision refers to the production and the distribution of
water and sewage implies wastewater collection and treatment. Water provision
and sewage are two distinct public services and can be managed by two different
operators. We focus in this paper on water provision. If the responsibility for pub-
lic services’ provision is public however, its management can be either public or
private. Although some municipalities manage production through direct public
management and undertake all operations and investments needed for the provision
of the service, the dominating organizational form is private management. Under
private management, the main contractual form is the lease contract in which the
operator manages the service, invest in the network and gets a financial compensa-
tion through consumer receipts.
Contrary to other industrialized countries, there is no price-cap or rate-of-return
regulation for water utilities in France as there is no national regulator. Such regu-
lation has been replaced by a contract in the case of a private operator, or a decision
of the municipality board in the case of public operation. In the case of delegated
management, rules have been defined to ensure that standards are respected during
the operation to limit the opportunistic behavior of operators and preserve com-
petition between firms. First, since the “Sapin Law” (1993) a national legislative
framework governs the form of the private sector participation and the conduct of
the bidding process. The institutional framework to select the private partner is the
following. If the public authority chooses a lease or a concession contract, it selects
its partners in two steps. First, the public authority launches a classical invitation
to tender which is open to all interested private water companies. Second, there is a
negotiation phase between the public authority and potential entrants that it short-
listed. At the end of the negotiation, the public authority chooses its final partner
for the duration of the contract. The selection of the private company follows the
intuitu personae principle according to which the municipality or the community
sets a list of criteria to select the firm that is considered as the best partner3.
Second, rules have been defined to ensure that standards are respected during
the operation to limit the potential opportunistic behavior of operators. These rules
support water quality, duration of contracts and information about management and
provision quality. In the case of water quality, a precise definition of more than 60
verifiable quality parameters has been set by the 1992 Water Act to ensure that
water services, would they be private or public, respect quality standards. Conse-
quently, water quality is respected and is rarely below a 95% score of conformity to
the standards of the microbiological analysis.
3However, the number of bidders remains low, around 1.9 for each bidding process (Guérin-Schneider
and Lorrain [2003]).
2.2 Price Settings
In the case of delegated management, public authorities face the classic regulatory
problem: they find themselves in an information asymmetry position and have few
tools to carry out their essential tasks. However, rules have been implemented to
limit opportunistic behavior by private operators. For example, in renegotiating
prices, operators are constrained by the fact that in administrative contracts, all
renegotiations that significantly change the value (by more than 5% of the value of
the initial contract) of the contract trigger a new selection process of the private
operator. Even if this power is rarely used, it provides a credible power to local
authorities in order to prevent opportunistic behavior from an operator.
As we have seen above, price setting is different whether the local community has
chosen to delegate the service to a private firm or not. Under direct public manage-
ment, the municipality council designs rates in order to generate revenues that allow
the utility to cover its costs. French legislation requires the water utility budget to
be balanced following the so-called “revenue-recovery principle”. Prices are thus set
to cover operating and capital costs. Administrative account rules are devised so
that municipalities hold two separate accounts for the water utility budget. The
first account is an operating budget and the second is an investment budget. Net
revenues from the operating budget are automatically transferred to the investment
budget in order to limit operating costs. This is usually the case if the municipality
undertakes a multi-year investment program. While the “revenue-recovery princi-
ple” usually implies a zero-margin cost structure, margins are however possible but
the way they are used is highly controlled by administrative rules.
Under private management, the rate structure is determined by projecting fi-
nancial accounts provided by the operator over the duration of the contract. The
contract includes periodic revisions of water rates using a price index adjusting for-
mula. The relationship between the local municipality and the firm is formalized by
means of a contract that specifies a price structure, a formula of price revision and
negotiated clauses allowing for exceptional conditions. Since the bargaining power
is often considered to be favorable to firms, the price structure is likely to reflect a
monopolistic behavior rather than social welfare maximization.
3 Data
3.1 Descriptive Explanations for Outsourcing
The unique dataset we use in this study merges three datasets. Data come from
the French Environment Institute (IFEN-SOeS), the French Health Ministry (DGS)
and the French National Institute for Economics and Statistics (INSEE). The unit
of observation is a municipality. We observe a set of 2,455 cities in France over four
years: 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2008. These cities are taken from a representative set of
municipalities. The final dataset is made of 9,820 observations over the four years.
Mean covariates and standard deviation are presented in Table (1) for the whole
sample and separately by management type. We also built an extra subsample to
test the impact of public debt on the marginal price of water that is presented in
subsection 5.
Descriptive statistics relative to the price equation are presented in Panel (A)
of Table 1. The main result from the descriptive statistics can be summarized as
follows: municipalities under private management face higher prices but also higher
costs. Some variables do not have a clear impact. High consumption density for
example ensures that fixed costs are covered but demands regular interventions on
the network to avoid interruptions. Network performance also can be considered
as the result of high investments or can only be inherited from the previous operator.
Panel (A) in Table 1 illustrates how private management is associated with
more difficult services. For example, ground water is usually associated with higher
treatment complexity because it is more polluted than underground water. Overall,
ground water is associated with higher production costs compared to underground
water. Water treatments performed by the operator before the water is distributed
are important cost-shifters. Indeed, water treatment does not only approximate the
complexity of service provision but also the level of specific investments needed to
operate the service. A telltale story is that underground water is generally more sta-
ble over time and that has two advantages. First, it reduces uncertainty about the
evolution of costs. Second, treatment costs are usually lower when water is pumped
from the underground. Under mixed sources of water, costs may be higher than for
ground or underground sources as the utility may need a treatment factory for each
type of water. Treatments are sixfold and coded between 1 and 6 in the IFEN-SOeS
dataset. In the simplest case, there is no treatment. In this case, the treatment
variable takes value 1. When raw water needs disinfection, treatment takes value 2.
The value is equal to 3 if raw water needs a heavy disinfection treatment and equals
4 if water needs a heavy disinfection treatment plus extra controls. The variable
takes 5 and 6 when mixed treatments are needed, the most difficult treatment being
5. As Table 1 shows, private management is associated with higher complexity and
less underground water; that can explain differences in costs and thus in prices.
Information for other controls is presented in Panel (B) of Table 1. Controls
are mainly about water quality which turns to be higher under private management
than under public management. The number of tests that do not meet the com-
pliance level is also on average lower under private management. Panel (C) finally
gives information about contract renewals and switches for the whole sample. On
average, 280 contracts are renewed every year for our 2,455 cities, which represent
16% of the stock of contracts in our dataset. Moreover, we observe switches from
public to private management and vice versa. There are on average every year 71
switches from private to public management and 53 switches from public to pri-
vate management. Obviously, there are rather low organizational changes in our
dataset because of the length of the contracts is on average 20 years in the dataset
and 12 years for contracts signed after 1995. There are two reasons fof this low
rates of organizational change: on the one hand, the longer are the contracts, the
higher are adjustment costs to switch from an organizational form to another; on
the other hand, inertia can be the outcome of such embedded relationships. These
contractual characteristics are useful to test the validity of the argument according
to which private participation is associated with higher prices.
Descriptive statistics give some patterns of municipalities and utilities that are
directly managed or outsourced. It is clear that private management occurs in mu-
nicipalities with difficult context, such as limitation of water consumption, complex
treatments, low raw water quality and touristic area for example. We also observe
that private management is more frequent in cities with contracting capabilities, for
example cities that contracted out the sanitation public service. Moreover, large
cities are more keen on contracting out their local public services, probably because
they have more resources to monitor contracts. Another argument, following Joskow
[1987], is that large (or urban) municipalities have relatively easy access to multiple
water suppliers, while small (or rural) municipalities have fewer options to outsource
their water public service. Contrary to Monteverde and Teece [1982] for example,
we do not observe a positive relationship between complexity or specificity and in-
house production. We will use in the further more detailed econometric analysis
above a model that consider complexity as impacting price but not selecting private
management. We discuss more deeply the hypothesis of endogeneity in section 4.3.
3.2 Graphical Analysis
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the price of a standard bill between 1998 and 2008.
The dark line represents price under private management and the light line scatters
price under public management. All prices are deflated at the 1998-level. The gap
between public and private management remains almost constant at 30 euros. We
only observe some slight convergence between 2004 and 2008.
Figures 2 and 3 show the evolution of the price of a standard bill between 1998
and 2008 in municipalities switching from an organizational type to another. Fig-
ure 2 shows the evolution of price under public management between 1998 and 2008
(solid line, circle markers) and for municipalities switching from public to private
management between 1999 and 2001 (dash-dot line, triangle markers), municipali-
ties switching between 2002 and 2004 (dot line, square markers) and municipalities
switching between 2005 and 2008 (dash-dot-dot line, plus markers). We observe
that municipalities switching from public to private management have a tendency
to increase price faster than municipalities remaining under public management for
the whole period. Municipalities switching between 2002 and 2004 experience a
large increase in price by 2004 but this tendency is counterbalanced between 2004
and 2008. Municipalities switching between 2005 and 2008 experience an increase
in price that is similar that in the non-switching municipalities. Overall, only mu-
nicipalities switching between 1999 and 2001 clearly demonstrates how switching to
private management can increase price for two reasons. First, we observe price evo-
lution after switching on a longer time period. Second, the price evolution between
1998 and 2001 is strongly similar and validates the positive impact of a switch in
prices for the remaining period. For municipalities switching in 2004 and 2008, the
graphical analysis is not conclusive.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of price under private management between 1998
and 2008 (solid line, circle markers) and for municipalities switching from private
to public management between 1999 and 2001 (dash-dot line, triangle markers),
municipalities switching between 2002 and 2004 (dot line, square markers) and mu-
nicipalities switching between 2005 and 2008 (dash-dot-dot line, plus markers). We
observe that municipalities switching from private to public management between
1999 and 2001 have a tendency to lower prices after switching management. Munic-
ipalities switching between 2002 and 2004 experience a decrease in prices by 2004
but this tendency is counterbalanced between 2004 and 2008. Municipalities switch-
ing between 2005 and 2008 experience a decrease in prices but the tendency is prior
to the switching. Prices even increase between 2004 and 2008. As in the previous
graph, only municipalities switching between 1999 and 2001 provides a clear argu-
ment supporting the fact that switching to public management lowers price for two
reasons. For municipalities switching in 2004 and 2008, the graphical analysis is not
conclusive because prior tendencies are not always similar. We study more deeply
these price evolutions in the next sections.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 The Impact of Private Participation on Prices
Our objective is to identify the average effect of private participation on the price of
a standard bill of residential water use. We are specifically interested in comparing
prices for a standard bill when water services are privately operated (our treatment
group) compared to directly managed water services (our control group) at the same
moment in time. To control for the unobserved heterogeneity and the unobserved
time invariant heterogeneity we include Département fixed effects, time fixed effects
and robust standard errors. We run alternatively a simple OLS model or a fixed
effects model that takes the form of the following equation:
Priceit = α0 + α1Privateit + γΘit + ηit (1)
with the marginal price Priceit as a dependent variable, Privateit a dummy that
equals 1 when water is distributed by a private operator and Θit a set of controls4
that can shift prices. The results from this model are reported in Table 2.
Model (1) in Table 2 is a simple OLS regression. It shows the mean price differ-
ence between private and public management when we take into account all controls.
While the gap between average prices is 30 euros, accounting for various character-
istics of the municipality lowers it to 22 euros. Model (2) runs the same model but
includes the lagged price. The price gap between public and private management
is now 7.30 euros. This model gives a closer result of what a municipality could
4Price is deflated using 1998 prices in euros. Control variables are water sources fixed-effects, water
treatments fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, département fixed-effects, population in log, a dummy for the
touristic nature of the city, a dummy whether cities regrouped in a pool of cities to provide public services,
a dummy if there is a limitation because of scarcity, a dummy if there is an investment program. We
also include three continuous variables. The first one is the independence of the city regarding water
measured as the ratio between water imports and billed water. The second one is network performance
measured as the ratio between billed water and billed water plus leaks. The last one is consumption
density, calculated as the ratio between daily billed volumetric charge of water and the length of the
pipes.
expect by switching from public to private management. One of the drawbacks of
this simple approach is that it is often serially correlated and it does not control for
omitted variables at the municipal level. However, it offers a lower bound of what
can really be the impact of private management on prices.
Alternative approaches to standard regression include fixed effects that are de-
signed to study the causes of changes within a municipality. This model controls for
all time-invariant differences between municipalities. Fixed effects cannot be used to
investigate time-invariant causes of the dependent variables. Time-invariant char-
acteristics of the individuals are supposed to be perfectly collinear with the entity
dummies. As a result, we expect the impact of private management to be lower
under fixed-effects than with cross-sectional estimates such as model (1). This is
the case in model (3) in Table 2 where the impact of private management is 9.01
against 22.34 in model (1). This coefficient is however susceptible to attenuation
bias from measurement error: first, because management type is likely to be persis-
tent over time and second, because small changes in management type can drive up
the coefficient of the impact of private management on price. If private management
is considered as a treatment effect, then the coefficient of the fixed effects model are
too strong and are considered as the upper bound of the real impact of a change to
private management. Model (4) shows the results of the fixed effects model when
one controls for serial correlation. We assume a simple cross-sectional time-series
regression models when the disturbance term is first-order autoregressive. We find
a 8.95 euros premium of private management on price. The AR(1)-FE coefficient is
in the bound of models (2) and (3).
To conclude this subsection, model (1) in Table 2 gives the average difference
between public and private management. Models (2), (3) and (4) give estimates that
are closer to the differences-in-differences approach. By controlling for fixed-effects
and omitted variables, we purge all the differences between cities except the premium
of private management. This gives a good proxy of the impact of organizational
changes on price. In the following section, we discuss the possibility of pairing cities
with similar characteristics to assess the impact of private management.
4.2 Micro-validity: Focusing on Switchers
As Masten [2002] underlines, an organizational form that is superior will always re-
sult in large efficiency gains compared to how the same unit would have performed
under the other alternative. Such a counterfactual is better approached by utilities
switching from an organizational form to another5. The aim of this section is not to
understand why municipalities switch from an organizational form to another but
rather to properly measure the impact of switches on performance. Our identifica-
tion strategy is close to the standard differences-in-differences method as developed
by Card and Krueger [1994] or Gruber [1994]. We focus on switchers from pub-
lic to private management and from private to public management. We apply the
standard differences-in-differences model :
Priceit = β0 + β1Switchit + β2Aftert + β3Switchit ·Aftert + λΘit + εit (2)
with Switchit a dummy that equals 1 if the city i has changed its management
type between 1998 and 2008, Aftert a dummy equal to 1 for the period after the
switch and β3 the coefficient of the standard differences-in-differences. As we have
a dataset including four years, we allow Aftert to cover three different periods (af-
ter 2001, after 2004 and after 2008). Moreover, we can differentiate between cities
switching from public to private management and those switching from private to
public management. We run four regressions using OLS with city-clustered robust
standard errors. Results are reported in Table 3. Models (1) and (3) analyze the
impact of a switch from private to public management. Models (2) and (4) study
the impact of a switch from public to private management. All controls from equa-
tion (1) are included. We did not report their coefficients as they are barely the
same in previous regressions. For ease of reading, we report in the first rows the
5We discussed in the graphical analysis above the similarity in outcome trends before the switch.
Moreover, for municipalities under private management, this is almost intuitive that price would increase
in a similar trend as all contracts include an escalator clause for prices.
differences-in-differences coefficients. The main results are emphasized.
Model (1) focuses on the sample of cities under private management in 1998.
All switchers from private to public management are compared to cities that remain
under private management for the whole period. We expect the β3 to be negative
as public management should have a negative impact on price. This is the case
in column (1) even if results are only significant for cities switching between 2004
and 2008. In the latter case, switching from private to public management leads
to a decrease in price by 7.755 euros on average. Model (3) uses as a sample the
whole dataset. The control group is made of all other cities, no matter if they were
under public or private management in 1998. The results are negative as in model
(1) but the main impact is more important. However, this regression gives a good
robustness test of model (1) as coefficient are barely the same. Results show that
switching from private to public management can decrease price in the short-term
but not necessarily in the long-term. This is a strong proof that differences in prices
between public and private management are rather structural than linked to the
organizational form itself.
Model (2) uses cities under public management in 1998 as a sample. The treat-
ment group is made of cities switching from public to private management. Cities
that remain under public management for the whole period are control units. In
this case, the β3 is expected to be positive if private management is by itself as-
sociated with higher prices. It is the case for cities switching between 1998 and
2001. However, it is not the case for cities switching between 2001 and 2004 and
2004 and 2008. The differences-in-differences is significant at 13.96 euros for 2001.
Cities that experienced a management change from public to private have to deal on
average with a large price premium for the remaining period. It is negative and non-
significant for municipalities switching between 2001 and 2004 and between 2004 to
2008. The interpretation is twofold. It means that price change after a change from
public to private management is not immediate. It also means that switching is
related to a potential decrease in prices. Model (4) uses the full dataset to estimate
the real impact on price of switching. We observe here results that are similar to
model (2) for the first period. Switching from public to private is associated with
higher prices. However, for the next periods, switching from public to private is
not associated with significant increasing prices. Indeed, the gain from switching
is about 15.12 euros in 2001. The β3 is positive but not significant for 2008 and
negative and non significant for 2004. It indicates that switching from public to pri-
vate does not lead to higher price on average in the most recent time periods. This
can be interpreted as the result of inertia in long-term contracting. Prices tend to
increase after several years when a city switched from public to private management.
The impact of organizational change on performance has rarely been studied
empirically in scientific articles. A recent paper by Chong et al. [2012] studies the
reason for switching - and not the impact of switching - from public (private) to pri-
vate (public) management using the same dataset as in this paper. They conclude
to a switch from private to public management when there is scope for improving
efficiency, measured by potential price decrease for a typical bill6. The authors
build counterfactual price of water by regressing price on a set of observables. They
identify the degree to which each municipality is “overpaying” or “underpaying” un-
der its current organizational form, and compared to the alternative organizational
form. Other controls, such as political bias from mayors or switches in mayors have
no impact. Results differ between large and small municipalities, small munici-
palities being less sensitive to efficiency gains. They find that large municipalities
respond to excessive prices by switching provider or organizational form. Overall,
cities switch to the form that is expected to be the lowest-price form. They inter-
pret the results as evidence that large municipalities’ ability to constrain franchiser
opportunism rests on its ability to credibly threaten to bring service in-house and
to promote competition when contracts are to be renewed. Overall, our results add
to those of Chong et al. [2012]. Switching from private to public management de-
creases price. Switching from public to private management potentially decreases
6Their conclusion is somewhat close to the one of Nickerson and Silverman [2003] who study the link
between transaction and organization on the one hand, and on the other hand, the link between alignment
of the organization to the transaction and performance.
price in the last periods, even if the effect is not significant.
How much then can we trust the robustness of our estimations? Focusing on
switching municipalities gives a micro-validity to the main argument that private
participation leads to higher prices. Two interpretations can be made. The first one
is that contracting-out leads to increasing prices over time. Cities switching from
public to private management between 1998 and 2001 are observed during a longer
time span and are associated with higher prices. Another reason is that competition
has increased between 1998 and 2008. Cities contracting out in 2008 can benefit
from lower prices, what was not the case in 2001. However, there are also some
limits to our results. We miss a set of variables that could explain the amplitude of
price evolution after a switch. One might argue that changes in prices are related
to the level of competition during the bidding process. In this case, the impact on
price of a switch may also be related to the number of bidders or to the relative
level of bids between the incumbent and competitors. However, our estimations
are interesting because they give a precise idea of the counterfactual price under
another organizational form using real-life data.7. A similar methodology is used in
Hastings [2004] to study the impact on gasoline retail price of competing stations
after a merger between a gas retailer and an integrated refiner-retailer and more
recently, in Ashenfelter and Hosken [2010] to estimate the likely price effect of five
completed mergers in the United States.
Using differences-in-differences is justified for several reasons. First, it shows
the impact of staggered management changes throughout the period. Secondly,
standard models as equation (1) evaluate only private management relatively to
public management. The differences-in-differences approach focuses on switchers
relatively to their control group at the beginning of the time period. The present
results thus mitigate previous results overall concluding to a positive impact of
private management on price. There is however at least one drawback to our results.
As we do not control for endogeneity, decision to change can be endogenous if they
7See the debate between Angrist and Pischke [2010] and Nevo and Whinston [2010] for more informa-
tion on credible exogenous variables and research design in industrial organization.
are linked to bids or to price evaluation made by the municipality, as Chong et al.
[2012] studied. We discuss in the next section limits to our findings.
4.3 Endogeneity
To properly evaluate the impact of private participation on prices, we assumed that
the make-or-buy decision was exogenous. Our argument above is that such an as-
sumption can be supported if we include enough controls for fixed effects and check
robustness with regime change. Yet we run in this section alternative models in-
cluding instruments that account for selecting private management.
Instrumented-variable regression is not easy to implement because one needs to
find good instruments that fit the robustness checks. Table 5 reports the results
for the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) instrumented regressors. Instruments are a
dummy equal to 1 if the public sanitation service is contracted out and the ratio
between exports plus imports and billed water. The latter variable is a proxy for
contractual capabilities as exports are made through subcontracts with other mu-
nicipalities (see Demsetz [1988] and Argyres and Mayer [2007]). The table reveals
that instrumenting for contractual capabilities decreases the impact of private par-
ticipation on price, as opposed to simple OLS regressions in Tables 2. The results
of the first-stage are reported in columns (1) and (3) and the results of the second-
stage are reported in columns (2) and (4). While in OLS regressors, the impact
of private management was 22 euros, it is now 19 euros. When we consider the
lagged price, we get an impact of 3.73 euros with the 2SLS while it is 7.31 with
OLS. The 2SLS isolates the variation in private management that is not correlated
with the error term. The coefficient under 2SLS reduces the sampling variance.
Cities have different profile in contracting, depending on their capabilities. Instru-
ments chosen here induce a self-selection as contracting-out may not be randomized.
We report in Table 5 several relevance and exogeneity tests of the instruments.
We first take a glance at the first-stage results. We reported in column (1) and
(3) the coefficients of the two instruments for the first-stage (we did not report the
coefficients of the excluded instruments). As we can see capabilities in subcontract-
ing and contracting for other public services have strong and significant impacts on
the make-or-buy decision. The partial R-squared is satisfying and the first-stage
F -stat is quite high. We also report the p-values of the Hansen J -test. p-values are
higher than 0.11 in column (2) and equal to 0.891 in column (4). A telltale story
is that a p-value higher than 0.25 satisfies the over-identification restriction. The
orthogonality condition has been checked for both instruments. Overall, our model
is robust and provides an efficient model of the impact of private participation on
price. We can include more instruments such as a proxy for production capabilities
or being part of a group of municipalities, to increase the first-stage R-squared but
at the possible expense of precision in the second stage. Finally, our present results
are robust to the inclusion of extra-instruments.
5 Why does contracting out increase prices?
Private companies may show higher prices than public management because man-
agement structure affects pricing. But it may also be the case that the management
variable is spuriously capturing the effect of another variable correlated with it.
Despite controls for selection and market-based analyses, difficulties remain to ex-
plain the price-gap between public and private management. Five reasons are often
pointed out by the literature but few empirical tests clearly quantify their impact.
The first reason is competition. Regional or sector-level competition is a usual
argument to explain differences in prices between public and private management
(see for example Borenstein and Rose [1994] on airline industries or Joskow [2005]
for a global perspective): high margins are the result of low competition-intensity
due to the nature of the market, i.e. local monopolies protected by a contract. When
there is no national regulator as in France (see above), margins are highly related to
the ability of the municipality to negotiate with the private operator. Nevertheless,
global margins remain low8 in France, far below the difference in rates between pub-
8See Porcher [2012] for a study of margins in French water industries for 2008. According to the
French private operators, net margins are on average 10% before taxes.
lic and private management. Pricing strategies are usually based on previous prices
for at least two reasons: first, because prices are fixed to cover previous costs, no
matter if there is room for cost-efficiency, and second because a given level of price
gives the quantity at which market clears. One of the reasons why private man-
agement has higher prices is that contract renewals are based on previous prices
and thereby maintain the price gap between public and private management. An
increased competition at the renewal generally lowers prices 9. The bidding pro-
cess at the end of the contract can itself create competition and thus price decreases.
As we have neither information on bids or geographical competition in our
dataset, we use incumbents’ renewals as a proxy for competition. In natural mo-
nopolies such as water provision, we can expect low competition to have a negative
impact on consumers (Coase [1946]) or to be associated with a low-monitoring effi-
ciency of the principal (Laffont and Tirole [1993]). Table 4 shows the impact of the
bidding process on price. The model is similar to equation (2). For ease of reading,
the first rows of Table 4 report coefficients of the differences-in-differences. The
control group is cities under private management in 1998. The Switchit variables
are dummies that take 1 if the city i switches from an operator to another at a
given year t. The Renewit variables are dummies that take 1 if the city i renews
its contract with the same operator at year t. Table 4 shows that switching is as-
sociated with lower prices. However the coefficient for the differences-in-differences
is only significant for cities switching in 2004. The magnitude of the impact is
however important and larger than a switch from private to public management
(the maximum is 24.30 euros here against -9.39 euros in Table 3). Renewals have
a negative significant impact in 2001 and 2008 but a positive significant impact in
2004. The impact is smaller than under a switching hypothesis. The gain is 4.12
euros in 2001 and 8.10 euros in 2008. Overall, it seems that the bidding process has
a negative impact on prices as switching and renewing contracts lead on average to
lower prices. The bidding process acts as a realignment of price from the previous
9The recent case of Antibes, a city in the south of France, is probably one of the best examples.
Contract renewal with the same operator led to a 40% decrease in price. A private competitor bade at a
30% lower price.
long-term contract.
The second reason is that the management variable may be capturing changes
in quality. This is consistent with the general debate on privatization. Critiques of
private management often argue that it leads to increased prices at the expense of
society (see Vickers and Yarrow [1988] for a discussion) while proponents argue that
increased prices result in large productivity gains (see La Porta and López-de Silanes
[1999] for a comprehensive study). In regulated industries, proofs of efficiency gains
for electricity in the United States are discussed in Fabrizio et al. [2007]. In our pre-
vious regressions, we systematically controlled for network performance. Another
control can be water quality. The reason why we did not control for water quality
is twofold. Firstly, water quality in France has been largely achieved since the 1995
water act. Secondly, we have only data for the tests carried out by the Health and
Environment Ministry while a number of tests are also conducted at the local level
or by the utilities themselves. As one can see in models (1) and (2) of Table 6,
private management is on average associated with a quality premium of 2.2%. In
model (2), we observe the potential quality change from a switch to private manage-
ment. The quality change is evaluated to be 1.2%. Finally, in model (3) we present
an OLS model to analyze the link between the number of failed quality controls
and management type. Private management is associated with a higher number of
failed controls but the coefficient is not significant. However, the number is quite
low regarding the highest number of controls made on privately managed utilities.
As far as price and final quality are related, pricing strategy may reveal differences
in how managers care about quality. Public managers care more about price levels
because their competitive advantage is the capacity to provide water at low price.
Private managers have more experience in providing good water quality at the risk
of higher price. This is however a limited result as quality is largely regulated and
depends on the raw quality of the water source.
The third reason is partly linked to the second. Public and private organization
may not reflect the same goals. Such a link between ownership and strategy is
early discussed in Williamson [1963] who considers that managers can have expense
preferences that are discretionary. Porter [1990] notices that “company goals are
strongly determined by ownership structure, the motivation of owners and hold-
ers of debt”. Public and private management may want to use pricing strategy to
indulge their consumption preferences. For example, public managers may want
to decrease prices for consumers and fund a part of its investments using taxation
for bureaucratic reasons. Private managers may seek to maximize their profits to
satisfy stockholders. Studies made by researchers in public management do not use
the same methodology but find a similar results: public managers have a stronger
desire to serve the public interest (Rawls et al. [2002]). These arguments are used
in many studies comparing public and private ownership such as in La Porta and
López-de Silanes [1999], Schargrodsky [2003] and Peng et al. [2004].
Another explanation is that private firms and public administration are not
subject to the same accounting rules. A complete comparison of public and pri-
vate accounting rules is far beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is clear
that private firms have to depreciate their investments over the lease term. In this
case, higher prices may just be the results of increased investments coupled with
the necessity to depreciate the whole value of the undertaken investments. In the
case of in-house provisions, the depreciation period of the investment can spread
over a longer term, thus alleviating the price increase. Such an argument is trust-
worthy and can rationally explain the differences in fixed-fees designed to cover
capital expenditures. It is however difficult to explain the existing differences be-
tween marginal prices which reflect differences in marginal costs or per-unit margins.
Finally, the incidence of the municipal water budget’s debt has largely been
ignored in previous research on utilities. Until 1995, it was possible for private
operators to endorse a part of the municipal water debt refunding. The growing
participation of private firms from the 1970s until now is probably linked to the
possibility for municipalities to reject the debt burden of private firms. If one as-
sumes that public utilities underprice their output, e.g. by funding investments
using municipal debt rather than increasing fees, then there should be significant
differences of indebtness levels between in-house and privately managed utilities.
Table 7 gives a comparison of debt, debt per customer, debt annual payments and
debt annual payments per customer for 189 large water utilities in 2009 represent-
ing more than 40% of the French population and almost 50% of the French water
consumption. Water budget’s debt is largely higher in municipalities under public
management than in privately managed water industries as Table 7 shows. Actual
annual repayments per customer are almost 3 euros higher under public manage-
ment. Additionally, Table 7 provides rescheduled debt payments under alternative
assumptions. For simplicity’s sake, we assume that debt interest rates are fixed, at
2%, a largely validated hypothesis10 that corresponds to what is observed in the
data. Under a 5-year refund hypothesis, annual debt payments per customer would
increase by 28.25 euros under public management and 17.33 euros under private
management. Under this hypothesis, the remaining differences in prices between
public and private management would almost be cleared-up. Under a 10-year re-
fund hypothesis, rescheduled annual payments per customer are very close to the
actual payment for public management and 4.15 euros below for private manage-
ment. One can thus consider that municipalities under private management have
borrowed less or for shorter terms than municipalities under public management.
Assessing the impact of debt on price is not easy. Current price contains annual
debt payments. Our fixed-effects regression in Table 2 controls for the existing
heterogeneity between utilities, debt including. Our argument here is that prices
could increase under the hypothesis of large increase in debt interests. Such price
increase and high debt levels can be distortive for consumers and producers alike.
On top of that there is a risk with high-debt level that the municipality use taxation
instead of market mechanisms to lower its debt. The welfare transfer between users
and tax-payers could have distortionary impacts on other markets.
10State debt is on average refunded at 2.02% but only 1.3% on the short-term debt. Municipalities
usually face rates at 2% in my dataset but it depends on their debt structure, i.e. whether they borrow
to private or public banks or other public operators.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of private participation on retail price in
residential water supply. We found that private management is on average more
expensive for customers than public management, everything else being equal. We
used econometric methods that isolates the impact of private participation on price.
Broadly speaking, the price difference on a bill of 120 cubic meters of water is rather
small, between 3 and 10 euros on average per year, for an average price of 144 euros.
We think that advocates of private management may be surprised to learn that our
best estimate of the price effects of private management are positive, not negative as
it would have been the case if private management were operating in cities that are
structurally more difficult. Likewise, we believe that some advocates of more public
intervention may be surprised to learn that public management is not associated
with huge price gaps and neither is more performance.
Our research carries several policy implications. First, municipalities must be
aware that switching from a management form to another will impact their prices,
but not in the proportion they expect. Structural reasons are probably more robust
at explaining price than organizational choice itself. Second, comparing munici-
palities between one and another imposes a reasonably similar sample in terms of
observables. Third, switching is costly. It demands to public managers strong or-
ganizational capabilities and a lot of financial resources to buy some fixed assets to
the former operator.
Our results have several limitations. First, our paper studies difference in per-
formance between public and private management between 1998 and 2008 but can
fail to explain price differences in the coming years, as our data does not allow us
to take into account competition intensity. Second, we are not able to account for
the potential long-term effect of organizational change on performance. Our results
suggest that long-term difference in price is not always significant. We lack indi-
cators of debt and capital output investments to properly measure the supposed
long-term performance of a switch and of a renewal.
We also think that our results pave the way for much further research. First, it
seems that the evaluation and the study of organizational changes is in its infancy.
In view of the extensive use to which these models are put, a careful evaluation of
their effectiveness needs to be done. Second, future research in economics and man-
agement could exploit such changes in organization, firm boundaries and ownership
to question models interpretation and comparing results using different methods,
including structural econometrics. We attempted to give some pathways to stronger
methodological design such as the use of reduced samples to comparable observa-
tions and the focus on micro-validity.
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Figure 1: Price Evolution under Public and Private Management
Figure 2: Prices Evolution in Cities under Public Management that Switched to Private
Management
Figure 3: Prices Evolution in Cities under Private Management that Switched to Public
Management
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Table 2: The Impact of Private Management on Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model OLS OLS Within-FE AR(1)-FE
Variables Price Price Price Price
Private Management (=1) 22.34*** 7.307*** 9.010*** 8.954***
(0.875) (0.889) (1.988) (2.137)
Pricet−1 0.744***
(0.0359)
Consumption Density -0.361*** -0.116*** -0.0756** -0.108**
(0.0319) (0.0303) (0.0295) (0.0455)
Independence -9.028*** -2.272 -7.870*** 2.638
(2.012) (1.590) (3.020) (2.754)
Network Performance -2.227 -7.965*** -1.298 -5.126*
(3.725) (2.961) (3.384) (2.852)
Ln(pop) -4.036*** -1.170*** -12.11* -7.781
(0.301) (0.297) (6.461) (4.881)
Limitation (=1) -0.836 0.848 -1.215 -1.748*
(1.673) (1.145) (1.052) (0.970)
Investment Program (=1) 2.671*** 0.432 -0.792 0.329
(0.908) (0.595) (0.590) (0.605)
Touristic Area (=1) 1.872 0.763 4.395** 3.941*
(1.245) (0.967) (2.198) (2.108)
Pool of cities (=1) 12.06*** 1.292 10.77*** 6.850***
(1.147) (1.090) (1.693) (1.898)
Ground Water (=1) 19.82*** 4.433*** 1.999 8.291***
(2.123) (1.225) (3.745) (2.740)
Mixed Water (=1) 4.645*** 2.093** -0.0215 3.927**
(1.346) (0.981) (1.950) (1.862)
Treatment 2 (=1) -0.0343 4.094 -4.901 -14.01**
(13.94) (3.038) (13.21) (6.392)
Treatment 3 (=1) 5.394 3.778 0.604 -13.75**
(14.46) (3.144) (13.54) (6.566)
Treatment 4 (=1) 6.962 3.926 -2.533 -14.73**
(14.73) (3.283) (14.51) (6.595)
Treatment 5 (=1) 6.744 3.677 -4.263 -14.80**
(14.91) (3.451) (15.05) (6.711)
Treatment 6 (=1) 9.938 5.842* -3.768 -14.46**
(14.47) (3.346) (13.65) (6.687)
Constant 160.8*** 44.11*** 235.5*** 211.8***
(19.43) (9.425) (49.48) (27.29)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional FE Yes Yes
Cities FE Yes Yes
Observations 9,820 7,365 9,820 7,365
R-squared (Within if FE) 0.427 0.759 0.030 0.018
Number of Groups 2,455 2,455
Note: The dependent variable is the price for a standard bill of water for a given
municipality. Model (1) is an OLS regression using the full sample. Model (2) is
model (1) including the lagged price. Model (3) is a within fixed-effects regression.
Model (4) performs an auto-regressive model with fixed-effects. Robust Standard
Errors in Parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for all models except
model (4) that features standard errors.
Table 3: Differences-in-differences of the impact of management change on price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switching From Private Public Private Public
to Public Private Public Private
Variables Price Price Price Price
Switch 2001 · After 2001 (=1) -6.561 13.96*** -7.634 15.12***
(8.729) (3.033) (7.189) (2.822)
Switch 2004 · After 2004 (=1) -6.949 -1.603 -9.096 -4.585
(11.22) (10.69) (10.19) (10.53)
Switch 2008 · After 2008 (=1) -7.755** -1.456 -9.393*** 1.824
(3.590) (5.332) (3.201) (4.653)
Switch 2001 (=1) -15.08* 7.686** -4.807 0.488
(8.484) (3.493) (5.994) (4.031)
Switch 2004 (=1) -7.779 -11.45 -2.378 -33.15***
(8.565) (8.483) (9.898) (6.570)
Switch 2008 (=1) -16.90* -2.773 -3.138 -19.41***
(10.20) (5.727) (7.755) (6.338)
After 2001 (=1) -0.377 1.201 -0.121 -0.437
(0.731) (1.049) (0.616) (0.611)
After 2004 (=1) 1.263** 0.900 0.612 0.530
(0.640) (0.712) (0.486) (0.478)
After 2008 (=1) 0.442 2.984*** 1.142** 0.890*
(0.643) (0.700) (0.492) (0.486)
Constant 198.4*** 133.6*** 166.3*** 168.8***
(51.35) (13.35) (30.27) (30.38)
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,810 3,064 9,820 9,820
R-squared 0.416 0.395 0.388 0.392
Sample Private Public Full Full
Note: All models are OLS regressions. The dependent variable is price for a standard
bill of a city i. City-Clustered Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses
with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models (1) and (3) analyze the impact of a
switch from private to public management. Models (2) and (4) study the impact
of a switch from public to private management. Models (1) compares switchers
relatively to non-switchers under private management. Model (3) evaluates switchers
regarding non-switchers under public management. Models (3) and (4) examine
switchers regarding the whole sample. A switch to public (private) management
means that the municipality switched from private (public) management to public
(private) management between t and t−1.
Table 4: Differences-in-differences for Private Firms Switching Operators and Contract
Renewal
(1)
Model OLS
Variables Price
Switch 2001 · After 2001 (=1) -2.188
(5.857)
Switch 2004 · After 2004 (=1) -24.30***
(5.815)
Switch 2008 · After 2008 (=1) -2.500
(3.854)
Renew 2001 · After 2001 (=1) -4.119*
(2.136)
Renew 2004 · After 2004 (=1) 3.766*
(2.273)
Renew 2008 · After 2008 (=1) -8.104***
(1.529)
Switch 2001 (=1) -7.110
(6.332)
Switch 2004 (=1) -2.904
(7.480)
Switch 2008 (=1) -7.279
(4.554)
Renew 2001 (=1) 1.527
(2.584)
Renew 2004 (=1) -6.637**
(2.706)
Renew 2008 (=1) -5.439***
(1.815)
After 2001 (=1) 0.235
(0.780)
After 2004 (=1) 1.096*
(0.663)
After 2008 (=1) 2.058***
(0.746)
Constant 215.0***
(49.42)
All Controls Yes
Observations 6,810
R-squared 0.418
Note: City-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses with ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is price for a stan-
dard bill. Switchers are cities that keep their public water service out-
sourced but switch from an operator to another. Contract renewal means
that the incumbent is renewed to manage the public water service. All
comparisons are made regarding cities that have private management in
1998.
Table 5: 2SLS results of the impact of private management on price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stage First-Stage 2SLS First-Stage 2SLS
Variables Private Management Price Private Management Price
Subcontracting 0.123*** 0.173***
(0.030) (0.034)
PPP Sanitation (=1) 0.337*** 0.322***
(0.009) (0.010)
Private Management (=1) 19.35*** 3.734**
(2.170) (1.771)
Pricet−1 0.755***
(0.0362)
Constant 116.1*** 37.21***
(15.50) (10.62)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments 2 2
First-Stage F -stat 657.79 484.77
p-value of Hansen J -test 0.112 0.850
Difference-in-Sargan Stat Yes Yes
Observations 9,780 7,352
R-squared 0.718 0.758
Partial R-squared 0.141 0.140
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results of the
First-stage equations are reported for the instruments. Second-stage are reported in raws (2) and
(4) after the first-stage equations. First-stage F -stat of excluded instruments is reported. p-values
of Hansen J -test are also reported. A telltale story is that a p-value higher than 0.25 satisfies the
overidentification restriction. The orthogonality condition has been checked for both instruments.
Table 6: Controlling for Quality Differences
(1) (2) (3)
Model OLS OLS OLS
Variables Water Quality Water Quality Number of “Failed” Tests
Private Management (=1) 0.022*** 0.012*** 0.063
(0.005) (0.004) (0.085)
Water Qualityt−1 0.590***
(0.030)
Constant 0.807*** 0.359*** -0.522
(0.036) (0.041) (0.454)
All Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,724 4,209 9,724
R-squared 0.216 0.561 0.127
Note: Observations are city-leveled. All models are standard OLS regressions. Robust
Standard Errors in Parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for all models. The
dependent variable in (1) and (2) is water quality measured as the compliance rate to the
standards of water quality controls. The value takes between 0 and 1. The dependent
variable in (3) is the number of water controls that do not meet the compliance rate. All
controls from the previous regressions are included.
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics, Extra Sample Including Water Municipal Debt
Public Management Private Management
Water Debt (in thousands euros) 6,599.79 5,858.392
(9,445.962) (17,080.28)
Water Debt per Customer (in euros) 277.0582 211.0306
(298.0969) (577.4516)
Annual Debt Payments (in thousands euros) 710.941 822.473
(1,012.309) (2,346.025)
Annual Debt Payments (ADP) per Customer (in euros) 30.525 27.644
(36.302) (72.057)
Rescheduled ADP per Customer, under 5-year hyp. 58.780 44.772
(63.244) (122.511)
Rescheduled ADP per Customer, under 10-year hyp. 30.844 23.493
(33.186) (64.286)
Note: Descriptive statistics from the complementary dataset on 189 big water utilities covering 24.3
millions inhabitants out and 1.87 billions cubic meters out of 60 millions inhabitants and 4 billions
cubic meters at the national level. Debt and annual debt payments are expressed in thousands euros.
Debt per customer and debt annual payments per customer are expressed in euros. Reschedules
debt annual payments are computed under two assumptions: a 5-year debt refund in the fifth raw
and a 10-year debt refund in the sixth raw, both under a 2% debt interest rate hypothesis.
